• The genesis of this program, which initially used Flock cameras, occurred under a previous Town administration and previous police administration. Therefore, we cannot speak from firsthand knowledge regarding the conversations or processes that led to its implementation. That said, generally speaking, absent a federal or state law requiring a public-hearing or referendum process for a particular technology or program, the acquisition of police technology does not necessarily require a separate public hearing or referendum.
• Fast forward to the current administration and the transition to AXON: The full AXON contract rewrite, which incorporated the replacement of the Flock system, was presented during the Town's public budget process, where public comment was permitted. The contract details were submitted to the appropriate Town boards and were discussed during public budget hearings. Meeting agendas are published on the Town's website in advance, allowing members of the public to review the matters being considered, formulate questions or concerns, and attend meetings either in person or virtually.
  
  
• It is also important to understand that, while the AXON contract incorporated an ALPR component, the broader contract was largely focused on increasing police accountability and transparency. With access to cameras on the network, use of drones, Taser deployments, and other technology comes a detailed audit trail. Time stamps, user identification, query information, and other system logs provide the ability to determine who accessed information, when it was accessed, and why it was accessed.

• Full details of the AXON contract can be found here: CONTRACT
  
  
• As part of the normal FY27 budget process, requiring three board approval in public budget hearing sessions, the town increased the Police Department’s “Information Technology” budget line to cover the costs of the AXON contract. This is all publicly accessible information on the town website.
  
  
• These are legitimate questions whenever public funds are being spent, and reasonable people can disagree about how limited resources should be allocated.
  
  
• While increasing the size of the police force is always desirable when staffing levels and finances permit, there is also a responsibility to remain current with the investigative techniques, equipment, and technology available to modern law enforcement. Criminal activity has changed considerably, and many investigations now depend upon digital or video evidence that simply did not exist—or was not readily available—years ago.
  
  
• ALPR technology is not a replacement for police officers, traditional investigative work, or community policing. It is another investigative tool. Used properly, it can help officers identify stolen vehicles, locate missing or endangered people, identify vehicles associated with criminal investigations, and develop evidence after a crime has occurred. The goal is not to monitor law-abiding residents; it is to provide investigators with another tool to solve crimes, protect victims, and hold offenders accountable.
  
  
• At the same time, the public is absolutely entitled to ask how that technology is governed. That is why clear policies, limited access, documentation, auditing, appropriate retention periods, and meaningful accountability are essential. The technology should serve the public—not operate without rules or oversight.

• There are a number of permitted uses under Connecticut's current ALPR framework, depending upon the circumstances of the investigation. The current POSTC ALPR Model Policy identifies permitted uses including:
• identifying stolen or wanted vehicles;
• identifying stolen license plates;
• locating missing, exploited, or endangered persons;
• locating persons with outstanding warrants or persons suspected of crimes;
• cases involving flight or evasion from law enforcement;
• locating fugitives from justice;
• certain situations in which physical surveillance of a criminal-investigation target would be dangerous or compromised;
• certain emergencies, such as wrong-way drivers, apparently intoxicated operators, or persons experiencing a medical emergency;
• fatal or serious-injury motor vehicle accidents;
• crashes involving evading responsibility;
• circumstances meeting an exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment; and
• certain national-security and counterterrorism purposes.
  
  
• Importantly, the policy does not authorize ALPR queries simply because someone is interesting, because their vehicle happens to be in a particular location, or because an officer is curious about where someone has been. For criminal investigations, the POSTC policy requires reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense was committed. The user must also document the reason for the query and provide a case number or other identifying number.
  
  
• A broken taillight does not, by itself, make someone's vehicle a wanted vehicle or authorize an officer to conduct a historical ALPR search simply to see where that person has been. Similarly, a person's presence near a crime does not automatically make that person a suspect or independently establish a legitimate purpose for searching ALPR history.
  
  
• As for geofencing, the technology should not be viewed as creating an independent authorization to conduct a search. Any query still has to satisfy an otherwise permissible law-enforcement purpose and the applicable legal and policy requirements.

• There can never be an absolute guarantee that an individual employee will never intentionally violate a law or policy. That is true of every profession in which society entrusts individuals with significant authority and access to sensitive information.
  
  
• The appropriate question, therefore, is what safeguards exist to deter misuse, identify it when it occurs, and hold the person accountable. In the case of ALPR, those safeguards include mandatory training, specifically authorized users, individual login credentials, required documentation of queries, case or identifying numbers, audit trails, supervisory oversight, and periodic audits. The POSTC Model Policy also expressly prohibits personal use of ALPR systems and data.
  
  
• Intentional misuse is not a minor policy violation. Depending upon the circumstances, misuse can result in administrative discipline, termination, decertification, civil liability, and potentially criminal prosecution. The existence of a system capable of detecting misuse is therefore a critical part of protecting the public.

• Police officers have access to numerous forms of highly sensitive information through criminal justice information systems, DMV records, investigative reports, body-worn cameras, and other systems used in the normal course of law enforcement. ALPR information is subject to many of the same fundamental safeguards, in addition to specific safeguards established for ALPR use.
  
  
• Those safeguards begin with legally restricted access and continue through department policies, specifically authorized and trained users, individual credentials, required documentation, and detailed audit trails. Under the current POSTC ALPR Model Policy, ALPR queries require the user to document the parameters and reason for the search, along with a case number or other identifying number. The policy also requires the department's ALPR administrator to conduct a quarterly audit of the system, including review of audit logs to determine whether queries were made for authorized and legitimate purposes.
  
  
• As with many of the functions we perform involving sensitive information, there is a robust system of internal accountability. Police officers are entrusted with access to information and authority that carries significant legal and ethical responsibilities. We take training, education, and compliance with federal and state law very seriously. Mandatory documentation and audit trails are fundamental to everything from information-system access to use of force.
  
  
• That does not mean accountability ends with the Chief of Police. Police departments operate within a larger system of oversight that includes POSTC, prosecutors, the courts, municipal oversight, and other state and federal authorities where applicable. POSTC has authority over the certification and decertification of Connecticut police officers, and Connecticut's recently enacted ALPR legislation has established additional statutory requirements concerning the use, retention, and sharing of ALPR information.
  
  
• It is also important to recognize that this is an evolving area of law and public policy. On August 7, 2026, Governor Ned Lamont called for a statewide review of safety cameras and ALPR technology, citing legitimate public concerns about privacy. He directed POSTC to develop guidance addressing permissible uses, how long information may be retained, how information may be shared, and what policies should be in place before these technologies are implemented. He also urged municipalities to pause installation of any new cameras and ALPRs until that guidance is completed.
  
  
• The Governor's action should not be interpreted as a finding that existing municipal ALPR programs are unlawful. Rather, it reflects the fact that this technology is evolving faster than the policy framework surrounding it, and that additional clarity and safeguards are appropriate. That is a position with which a police department and the public can reasonably agree.

• The 30-day provision is not simply a Town-created exception. The current POSTC ALPR Model Policy provides that ALPR data should not be retained for more than 30 days unless it pertains to a criminal, administrative, or civil matter. In anticipation of amended POSTC guidelines, the Fairfield Police Department has already lowered its retention period to 21 days.
  
  
• The purpose of that exception is evidence preservation. Once information has become relevant to an identifiable matter, it may need to be preserved beyond the ordinary retention period rather than automatically deleted while an investigation, administrative proceeding, litigation, or other matter remains pending.
  
  
• The phrase “civil matter” is admittedly broad, and it is reasonable for the public to ask how that provision is interpreted and applied. However, it should not be understood to mean that an officer can simply designate someone's historical movements as a “civil matter” in order to retain them indefinitely. The retention exception should be tied to an identifiable matter and governed by applicable law and departmental policy.
  
  
• For example, if ALPR information lawfully obtained during an investigation subsequently becomes relevant evidence in a civil proceeding arising from the underlying incident, preservation of that particular information could provide a legitimate reason for retaining it beyond the normal retention period. The fact that a matter is civil, however, does not by itself create unlimited authority to retain ALPR information.
• This is also an area in which additional statewide guidance would be useful. Governor Lamont's August 7, 2026 request to POSTC specifically asks the Council to address how long ALPR information may be stored and how it may be used and shared.

No. Federal agencies do not have direct query access to Fairfield’s ALPR data.

All sharing requests come through the Office of the Chief of Police however we do not permit outside agencies to query our data.

February 2025 Bias Crime Investigation: During an investigation into bias motivated graffiti, ALPR technology helped identify a vehicle associated with the incidents. Detectives identified and charged the responsible party.

May 2025 Street Takeover: ALPR cameras also played a key role in a major investigation after a reckless “street takeover” endangered dozens of people at a local shopping plaza. By combining ALPR data with community videos and interagency support, officers identified multiple offenders across different towns, leading to several arrests and vehicle seizures.

June 2025 Financial Exploitation Case: In an investigation involving the financial exploitation of an elderly resident, ALPR data assisted detectives in identifying a suspect vehicle connected to the incident. The information supported the issuance of an arrest warrant.

June 2025 Fatal Crash: Following a tragic crash where the driver fled the scene, officers used ALPR evidence to quickly identify and locate the suspect’s vehicle, leading to an arrest the same evening.

July 2025 Missing Person: In another example, ALPR systems were leveraged during the search for a missing Fairfield woman with dementia. Alerts were added across regional plate readers, helping investigators quickly rule out certain areas and focus resources. Combined with financial tracking and interagency coordination, the subject was safely located in New Haven within hours.

December 2025 Commercial Burglary Spree: During a series of overnight commercial burglaries along Post Road, ALPR cameras captured a vehicle entering and leaving the area around the time of the crimes. Working with regional partners, investigators identified the suspect and obtained an arrest warrant.